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1. Introduction 
In urban China an egalitarianism-oriented housing system was previously used to allocate 
free houses to urban residents working in the state sector, which was the predominant 
provider of jobs. In the 1990s housing reform gradually abandoned the old system and 
established a housing market. Since then housing has become a major topic in urban 
China. In 2009 the television drama woju (Dwelling Narrowness) that depicted the 
difficulty, and frustration, of buying a home in cities provoked national discussion and 
debate on housing affordability confronting Chinese households (Liang, 2010). Rapidly 
rising house prices and increasing housing inequality have been reshaping the Chinese 
urban landscape and impacting on the subjective wellbeing of the urban population.  
There are large economics and psychology literatures on the determinants of subjective 
wellbeing (see Dolan et al. 2008 for a review). There are, however, relatively few studies 
on the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing (as opposed to the 
relationship between home ownership and housing satisfaction, for which there are more 
studies – see review in Zumbro, 2014). Findings on the relationship between home 
ownership and subjective wellbeing are mixed. Most studies have found that homeowners 
have higher subjective wellbeing (see eg. Stillman & Liang, 2010; Ruprah, 2010; Zumbro, 
2014). However, Rossi and Weber (1996) only found weak support for the hypothesis 
that there is a positive relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing, 
with many variables insignificant. Meanwhile, other studies have found that once one 
controls for demographic differences, there is no evidence that homeowners have higher 
subjective wellbeing than non-homeowners (see eg. Bucchianeri, 2009). 
There is a growing body of literature on the determinants of subjective wellbeing in 
China (see eg. Gao & Smyth, 2011; Knight et al., 2009; Mishra et al., 2014). The existing 
research on housing and subjective wellbeing in China is very limited. Based on the 2006 
China General Social Survey (CGSS), the only housing-specific study published in 
English finds that home ownership and subjective wellbeing are positively correlated (Hu, 
2013). There are three further studies in Chinese (Li et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2012; Sun & 
Zheng, 2013). Lin et al (2012) also used the 2006 CGSS to examine the effect of home 
ownership and house price increases on subjective wellbeing. Their findings were that 
homeowners exhibit higher subjective wellbeing than renters, multi-homeowners have 
higher subjective wellbeing than single homeowners and that house price rises have a 
positive effect on subjective wellbeing of homeowners and a negative effect on the 
subjective wellbeing of renters. Li et al (2012) use the 2009 China Urban Economic 
Conditions and Psychology Survey to compare the subjective wellbeing of those with full 
ownership, on one hand, and partial and minor ownership on the other. Their main 
finding is that the subjective wellbeing of those with full ownership is higher than those 
with either partial ownership or minor ownership as well as non-homeowners. Sun and 
Zheng (2013) use data collected in 2010 to compare the subjective wellbeing of those 
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with, and without, home ownership, owners of commodity property (sold in the open 
housing market) and housing reform property (sold to occupants at discounted prices). 
They found that both property types are positively correlated with subjective wellbeing.                    
This study contributes to the literature on the relationship between home ownership and 
subjective wellbeing in China by presenting a theoretical model linking a gradient of 
property rights in housing to subjective wellbeing in China and empirically testing the 
predictions of the theoretical model. To do so, we use data collected from over 5000 
urban residents in 2011 from all provinces and municipalities in mainland China, except 
Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. We use a more recent dataset than previous studies, 
allow for a greater range of ownership forms, consider the source through which 
ownership was acquired and not only consider whether homeowners have a home loan, 
but also consider the source of the loan. Foreshadowing the main results, first, we find 
that home ownership is positively correlated with life satisfaction and that having a home 
loan has a negative effect on life satisfaction. Second, we find that full ownership and 
partial ownership is positively related with life satisfaction, while minor ownership has a 
negative effect on life satisfaction. This result is consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical model in a world in which there is significant risk of adverse future events.  
2.  Conceptual framework 
In this section we present a simple model that captures several stylised facts about home 
ownership. Our model focuses on the different ownership forms that exist in China and 
how these interact with an individual's subjective wellbeing. In this respect, China not 
only has renters and homeowners; it also has different forms of home ownership. 
Homeowners can have full, partial or minor ownership and these differ in terms of 
security and liquidity.  Full ownership is where the owner has a property deed issued by 
state authority, which is transferrable in the housing market. Partial ownership is where 
the owner does not have a state-issued property deed. Partial property rights are usually 
acquired with housing purchased at prices subsidised by governments or enterprises. A 
partial property right gives a homeowner the right to use the property or to sell it after a 
certain period with restrictions on the treatment of capital gains. This is usually levied in 
the form of a land use fee (Chen, 1996). Minor homeownership (xiao chanquan) refers to 
housing with limited property rights, built on collectively owned rural land and sold to 
buyers outside the collective ownership. Theoretically, this form of ownership is not 
officially recognized and thus illegal in China, although in practice it is a common 
phenomena in urban villages and suburban areas (Chen, 2010).  
Owning a house potentially provides both personal and social benefits relative to renting. 
For example, renting provides less security of tenure for tenants than if the tenants owned 
their own home and this may reduce incentives to invest in the local community (see eg. 
Hu, 2013; Ruprah 2010).  We would expect that these benefits of home ownership would 
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be reflected in an individual's assessment of their subjective wellbeing. However, there 
are also arguments suggesting a negative relationship between home ownership and 
subjective wellbeing. One important reason could relate to financial capacity. If a 
household has a home loan, then this may create potential financial stress. An adverse 
event, such as the loss of employment by one member of a household or an accident 
requiring expensive health care, may have a greater negative impact on a homeowner 
with a loan than on either a homeowner without a loan or a renter. Another important 
reason could relate to mobility. Home ownership might reduce one’s flexibility and 
mobility, lowering subjective wellbeing. Low-income households, in particular, might be 
forced to take out large mortgages to purchase in distressed neighbourhoods on the city 
fringes or outer suburbs (‘the mortgage belt’) and be locked into their locale because of 
negative equity in their home. This will be particularly problematic if there are declining 
jobs in the area and the individual is forced to travel long distances for work. This was a 
common phenomenon in many countries in the fallout from the Global Financial Crisis, 
contributing to lower subjective wellbeing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2011). 
If future uncertainty, such as financial uncertainty and uncertainty over other ‘life events’, 
impact the relative subjective wellbeing of homeowners and renters, this should also be 
reflected in different wellbeing for other types of home ownership in China, such as 
partial and minor property rights. To see this, denote the ‘form’ of ownership for an 
individual i by             , where      means the individual is renting, while 
           means that the individual is a home owner. If      then the individual 
has ‘full’ ownership, while ‘partial’ and ‘minor’ ownership are represented by      and 
     respectively. Thus, for homeowners, both security of ownership and liquidity of 
ownership (i.e. ease of property sale) are ordered with f both more secure and more liquid 
than p, which is more secure and liquid than m.  
Homeowners differ not just by the type of ownership but also by whether or not they 
have a home loan. We denote the existence of a loan for individual i by the dummy 
variable Li where Li = 1 if the individual has a home loan and Li = 0 otherwise.
1
 
An individual’s subjective wellbeing will depend on both their expectations about the 
future and the potential risks that they face in the future. To start, assume that all 
individuals have the same expectations. Let S denote the set of potential future states of 
the world, and divide S into two subsets so        . The set S1 are those states where 
there is either no stress on the individual or the level of stress is not sufficient to impinge 
on the individual’s housing decision. The set S2 are those states of the world where the 
individual faces negative events that do potentially impinge on their home ownership. For 
example, S2 will include those situations where the individual faces financial stress. If the 
individual is a renter then this stress may force them to move and ‘downgrade’ their 
                                                          
1
 Clearly for renters, xi =0 and Li = 0. 
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accommodation. If the individual is a homeowner, the stress may force them to sell their 
house and move to different accommodation. 
Let    be the probability that a state in Sj, j =1,2, arises where         . Let 
              be the (expected) utility of individual i in the set of states Sj given their 
ownership status xi and their loan status Li. We would expect:  
                                                   . 
In other words, an individual or household will have higher utility when not facing 
financial or other stress than when they are facing such stress. Further, if an individual is 
facing stress, having a housing loan can only exacerbate that stress and lower their 
utility.
2
 In states S1 where there is no relevant stress, we would expect: 
                                                  . 
This reflects the benefits of home ownership relative to renting in these situations and the 
benefits of more secure ownership on the individual's subjective wellbeing. Similarly, in 
states S2 where stress arises, if the individual does not have a home loan we would expect:   
                                               . 
This again reflects the benefits of security of property rights and (potentially) liquidity 
under different forms of ownership when facing stress. Further, it reflects that, in the 
absence of a home loan, a homeowner is likely to face increased security relative to a 
renter. Stress may make it difficult for a renter to meet financial obligations (including 
rent) that can be met or deferred by a homeowner without a home loan. Thus, a renter has 
a greater risk of moving and losing location specific sunk capital in situations of stress 
relative to a homeowner who does not have a home loan.   
In contrast, in states S2, if the homeowner does have a home loan, we would expect this to 
raise the risk of a forced sale of the home. Again, we would expect: 
                                   . 
This reflects that homeowners with full property rights have greater liquidity to sell their 
property relative to homeowners with partial property rights. And partial property rights, 
in turn, are more secure and liquid than minor property rights.  
 
                                                          
2
 Having a home loan may or may not lower subjective wellbeing significantly in those situations where the 
individual or household does not face stress.  Hence we allow for individual subjective wellbeing in states 
S1 to be approximately invariant with regards to loan status. 
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It is not clear, however, whether a renter (who does not have a home loan) would be 
better off than some or all homeowners in this situation. For example, it is possible that 
                       , reflecting that a home owner with minor property rights and 
a home loan might gain lower utility than a renter who is relatively more flexible in this 
situation.  
Given these state-contingent levels of utility, an individual’s current subjective wellbeing 
may be represented by the expected utility over future events. Denoting subjective 
wellbeing by          , we have:  
                                           . 
It follows that: 
 Regardless of whether or not a homeowner has a home loan, we expect subjective 
wellbeing to rise the more secure and liquid are the individual’s property rights 
over their home. Thus, given their loan status, individuals with full property rights 
will have higher subjective wellbeing than individuals with partial property rights, 
which, in turn, will be higher than individuals with minor property rights. 
 Given an individual’s home ownership status, subjective wellbeing will be higher 
for an individual without a home loan than an individual with a home loan.  
 An individual who rents will have lower subjective wellbeing than a homeowner 
unless there is a significant risk of an adverse future event. If this risk is 
significant, a renter may have higher subjective wellbeing than a homeowner with 
a home loan, particularly if the homeowner has minor property rights. 
 
3. Data 
The data used in this study was collected in 2011 through the China Household Finance 
Survey (CHFS) administrated by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in 
China. The 2011 CHFS employed a stratified three-stage probability proportion to size 
(PPS) random sample design. The first stage selected 80 counties (including county-level 
cities and districts) from 2,585 counties (primary sampling units, or PSUs) from all 
provinces and municipalities in mainland China except Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia. The second stage selected four neighbourhood committees/villages from each 
of the selected PSUs at the first stage. The third stage selected 20-50 households 
(depending on the level of urbanization and economic development) from each of the 
neighbourhood committees/villages chosen at the previous stage. Every stage of sampling 
was carried out with the PPS method and weighted by population size.  
The 2011 CHFS collected information from 8,438 households from rural and urban 
areas. In this study, we used a sample of 5,229 urban respondents who provided 
information pertaining to housing, subjective wellbeing and other key variables used in 
this study. Subjective wellbeing was measured by responses to the question: Overall, are 
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you satisfied with your life? Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = very dissatisfied to 5 = very satisfied. The survey contained various 
questions relating to home ownership, source of ownership, mortgage status, type of loan, 
housing tenure and housing conditions. The CHFS also collected data on the usual 
control variables that previous studies suggest are correlated with subjective wellbeing, 
such as human capital and political capital which are likely to have significant effects on 
the access of urban Chinese to homeownership (Liu & Mao, 2012).  
[Tables 1 & 2 here] 
Table 1 shows life satisfaction for homeowners and non-homeowners who do not have 
any one of the three types of home ownership (full, partial or minor). The mean life 
satisfaction of homeowners is consistently higher than non-homeowners. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics on all variables used in the study. Just under half the sample were 
male, 84.93 per cent were married, 29.96 per cent held a rural hukou (household 
registration), 19 per cent were members of the Communist Party and 47.26 per cent lived 
in the relatively well-developed eastern region. The average years of schooling were 
10.34 years and the average monthly income was 1358 RMB.  
Overall, 87.74 per cent of the sample owned homes (ie. owned a home outright or with a 
mortgage). Just over 70 per cent of the sample owned one property, while 16.17 per cent 
owned more than one property. The average number of properties owned was 1.07. 
CHFS asked questions distinguishing between full ownership, partial ownership and 
minor ownership. About 70 per cent of the sample had full ownership rights, 16.17 per 
cent had partial property rights and 7.21 per cent had minor property rights.  
The survey contained information on the source of homeownership. The main sources of 
homeownership were purchasing (52.71 per cent) and self-built (33.73 per cent). About 5 
per cent acquired the property through inheritance and 3 per cent were resettled following 
demolition or redevelopment. The constructions of many of the properties in the final 
category are of poor quality and are removed from the city centre in which many resettled 
residents used to live. Moreover, it is more difficult to resell them in the market because 
of their vaguely defined ownership rights. Usually, the property rights in such homes take 
the form of partial or minor ownership. Ten per cent of the sample had a home loan. Of 
those with a home loan, 92.67 per cent had a commercial bank loan, 1.87 per cent had a 
housing provident fund loan and 5.46 per cent had a portfolio loan.
3
 Other property-
related variables included length of time in the property (mean was 11.8 years); property 
size (mean was 99.59 square metres); whether the respondent thought the property in 
which he/she lived had appreciated in value (85.35 per cent considered it had) and 
whether the respondent expected interest rates and property prices to increase. 
                                                          
3
 A portfolio loan is a combination of commercial loans provided to the borrower to make up the shortfall 
in case the housing provident fund loan applied for is not sufficient to pay the house price. 
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 4. The empirical model 
We estimate the following empirical function: 
                
where LS is life satisfaction for the ith respondent,; X is a vector of personal and regional 
characteristics; H is a vector of housing-related characteristics; and ε is the error term.
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There are different methods to treat subjective wellbeing indicators. In a methodological 
paper, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) suggest that results are not sensitive to the 
choice of ordinary least squares (OLS), that treats subjective wellbeing variables as 
cardinal, or ordered probit/logit methods that treats them as ordinal. On theoretical 
grounds, Ng (1997) advocates treating subjective wellbeing as cardinal. In the main 
results we do so and use OLS; however, in the robust checks, presented later in the paper, 
we also present results in which we treat subjective wellbeing as being ordinal. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) find that the determinants of subjective wellbeing 
are sensitive to standardisation for individual fixed effects in datasets, which lack 
variables controlling for personality. Standardization tends to reduce the size of positive 
coefficients on income because having a personality, which is conducive to higher 
subjective wellbeing, is also associated with having a higher income. This finding implies 
we should instrument for income and control for personality. In the robust checks below, 
we instrument for income. We control for personality by including variables measuring a 
range of expectations about the future and attitudes to risk. Previous research suggests 
that personality traits are correlated with expectations about the future (see eg. Oettingen 
& Mayer, 2002) and risk-taking behavior (see eg. Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). 
5. Results 
The main results, estimated using OLS with cluster-robust standard error to take into 
account within-province correlation, are presented in Table 3. In Column (1) we examine 
the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing, controlling for 
individual characteristics. The main finding is that the coefficient on the dummy variable 
for home ownership is positive and significant and that the life satisfaction of 
homeowners is 0.21 points higher than non-homeowners. This result is consistent with 
the general predictions of the conceptual model in Section 2, abstracting from the 
nuances of alternative forms of property rights.  
[Table 3 here] 
                                                          
4
 In the results below we control for the region of China (east, central or west) in which the individual lives. 
Controlling for the province in which the individual lives, rather than region, does not change the results. 
9 
 
In Column (2) we examine the relationship between the form of home ownership and 
subjective wellbeing, controlling for individual characteristics. The life satisfaction of 
those who have full or partial ownership are 0.19 and 0.26 points higher, respectively, 
while the life satisfaction of those who have minor ownership is 0.13 points lower than 
renters. This result is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model presented in 
Section 2.  The negative coefficient on minor ownership is consistent with individuals 
responding to the risk of adverse future events and likely reflects the lack of security for 
property rights and inalienability and other restrictions imposed on the usage of the 
property. Given the insecurity of property rights, developers, as well as homeowners, 
tend to invest less in construction quality, property management and public facilities 
associated with the development reducing subjective wellbeing (Deng, 2009). Moreover, 
given many minor ownership developments occur on rural land in the outer suburbs and 
on the urban fringes, the negative coefficient might also be a reflection that owners are 
removed from the amenities and attractions of living in the city proper (Hsing, 2010).  
That the coefficient on full ownership is smaller than that on partial ownership in Column 
(2), most likely reflects that some owners have mortgage loans to repay. This increases 
their financial burden. This would be consistent with the predictions of the conceptual 
model presented in Section 2. Column (3) examines this issue directly by reporting 
results in which full ownership is interacted with having a home loan. The coefficient on 
the interaction term is negative, consistent with this view.  
In Column (4), in addition to individual characteristics and form of homeownership, we 
consider the number of properties one has, property size, primary property tenure, source 
of the ownership and whether one has a home loan and the source of the home loan. The 
sign and significance on form of home ownership is similar to Columns (2) and (3). The 
coefficient on property tenure is negative and significant, while the coefficient on 
property size is positive and significant, but the magnitude is small. The number of full 
and minor ownership properties is positively related to life satisfaction. Each additional 
full ownership property one has, increases life satisfaction 0.12 points, while each 
additional minor ownership property one has, increases life satisfaction 0.27 points. This 
reflects that full and minor ownership properties are often more popular than partial 
ownership properties among investors, thus contributing positively to the life satisfaction 
of multi-property owners. The reasons are that full ownership properties are usually 
better protected by law, are built in better locales and appreciate faster than the other two 
ownership forms, while minor ownership properties are the easiest to rent out because 
they are the most affordable among these three types to low income tenants.  
In terms of source of ownership, compared with the reference case, purchased property, 
those with property acquired through inheritance, self-built or resettlement had lower life 
satisfaction. This finding is related to the quality and location of the housing. Inherited 
and self-built properties are usually older and more difficult to maintain. Properties 
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acquired through resettlement are often of low quality and located away from the city 
centre. We now turn to the type of loan. Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical 
model in Section 2, the subjective wellbeing of those with a home loan is 0.49 points 
lower than those without a home loan. Of those who do have a home loan, relative to 
those with a portfolio loan, those with a housing provident fund loan (0.55 points) and 
those with a commercial bank loan (0.50 points) have higher life satisfaction.  
This result reflects that applying for a portfolio loan is more complicated and one needs 
to pay additional fees and loan protection insurance. Media reports suggest that 
mortgagers applying for, and repaying, portfolio loans face a number of difficulties. For 
instance, they need to prepare more documents and sign two contracts because they are 
dealing with both commercial banks and government agencies. It also takes a longer time 
(usually several months to half a year) to get approval compared to the other two types of 
loans (which usually take one or two weeks). Some real estate developers do not accept 
portfolio loans because the procedure is complicated and it takes them longer to receive 
payment from the banks and government agencies.  For example, it was reported that in 
Beijing only three out of ten real estate developers were willing to accept portfolio loans 
(Zhang & Li, 2008). The situation has improved since the Global Financial Crisis, but has 
deteriorated in recent years because of the heated housing market. For instance, in 
Guangzhou a developer provided a 7 per cent discount to commercial loan mortgagees, 
but no discount to portfolio loan mortgagees; and another developer asked purchasers to 
pay additional fees, equivalent to 4 per cent of the house price (Ou, 2013). Some 
mortgagees have to make higher down payments and monthly repayments in order to 
persuade developers to accept portfolio loans (Qiu & Pang, 2013). There are many other 
reports of similar complaints in other cities on the difficulties of using portfolio loans. 
The final column is the full specification in which, in addition to the variables in Column 
(4), we control for the individual’s expectations. The findings for form of ownership, 
number of properties, source of ownership, whether one has a home loan and type of 
home loan, as well as housing characteristics are largely the same as in the earlier 
columns.  The results for individual characteristics and expectations variables are largely 
as expected and mostly consistent with previous studies (see Dolan et al., 2008).  
The one variable that requires comment is income. Income is insignificant, except in the 
final column in which the coefficient is negative and weakly significant. The magnitude 
of the coefficient, however, is very small. The negative coefficient on income reflects the 
fact it is endogenous. When we instrument for income, below, income is either 
insignificant or positive. One might be concerned that income is insignificant, even in 
some cases after instrumenting. This is a common finding in previous studies of the 
determinants of subjective wellbeing in China. For instance, Knight et al. (2009), Mishra 
et al. (2009) and Monk-Turner and Turner (2012) get the same result. While it is not an 
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issue we address in this paper, these studies suggest that relative income is more 
important than absolute income for subjective wellbeing (see eg. Mishra et al., 2014). 
6. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
Knight et al. (2009) note that unobserved characteristics, such as personal energy, might 
increase income and subjective wellbeing or higher subjective wellbeing might rise 
income through higher productivity. Hence, income is endogenous. To address this point, 
following Gao and Smyth (2011) and Kingdon and Knight (2007), we instrumented for 
income using monthly household consumption expenditure. As Kingdon and Knight 
(2007, p.86) put it: “Expenditure seems to be a reasonable instrument for income since it 
is unlikely that measurement error in per capita income will be correlated with 
measurement error in per capita expenditure”. The results of the two-stage least squares 
regression for the full specification with consumption as an instrument are presented in 
Table 4. The result of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square endogeneity test rejects the null 
hypothesis that income is exogenous. The result of an underidentification test rejects the 
null hypothesis that consumption is not correlated with income. The result of a weak 
identification test did not reject the null hypothesis that consumption is strongly 
correlated with income. In sum, consumption is found to be a valid instrumental variable. 
In contrast to the OLS estimates in Column (5) of Table 3, the coefficient on income is 
positive and significant. This result is consistent with downward bias in the income 
variable in the OLS results, due to measurement error (Knight et al., 2009). The key 
results for home ownership remain intact in that those who have full and partial 
ownership continue to have higher life satisfaction and those who inherited ownership 
continue to have lower life satisfaction, relative to those who purchased properties. 
However, whether one has a home loan, the type of home loan one has and the number of 
properties one has of various ownership forms become insignificant. 
[Table 4 here] 
While we have attempted to show that consumption is a valid instrument for income, 
doubt may still linger about the exclusion restriction, which cannot be tested directly. 
Thus, we check the robustness of our instrumental variable results using the methodology 
recently proposed by Lewbel (2012), which is an identification strategy that does not rely 
on external instruments, but rather, constructs an internal instrumental variable based on 
the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data. The estimation problem is: 
    
′                                                                                          (1) 
    
′                                                                                                  (2) 
Let    be subjective wellbeing and    be income.   denotes the individual’s unobserved 
characteristics which affect both his/her subjective wellbeing and income.    and    are 
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idiosyncratic errors. Assume that   is a vector of observed exogenous variables; in which 
typically Z=X. Lewbel (2012) argues that, if the following hold: 
                                              
and there is some heteroscedasticity in   , one can estimate the set of equations above by 
using two stage least squares with an estimate of [      ]   as the instrument. The 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity rejected the null of a constant variance in each 
case, which is a precondition for the Lewbel (2012) strategy. We report the Lewbel (2012) 
estimates in Column (2) of Table 4. The results, in terms of sign and significance are 
almost identical to the final column of Table 3. The exception is that income is 
insignificant when we employ the Lewbel internal instrumental variable.  
Diaz-Serrano (2009) suggests that duration of residence might also be endogenous if 
people are more likely to move because they are not satisfied with their housing 
arrangements. Diaz-Serrano (2009) addresses this issue by re-estimating the specification 
excluding duration of residence. We do likewise for the full specification. The results are 
reported in Column (3) of Table 4. The findings are almost identical to those reported in 
Column (6) of Table 3. The only exception is that income is insignificant. 
Although the vast majority of households own only one property, three sources of 
potential wealth effects may be confounding the effect of homeownership on subjective 
wellbeing. The first is that wealthy households tend to live closer to city/town centres in 
which there are good schools, green spaces, shopping centres or public facilities that 
might be important factors affecting subjective wellbeing. The positive effect of 
homeownership on subjective wellbeing may be reflecting not only homeownership per 
se, but also include local amenities and changes in amenities over time and space. The 
second is that homeownership may be simply a proxy for household wealth, such that it is 
wealth that has a positive effect on subjective wellbeing. The third is that the housing 
reform in 1998, during which state employees purchased their properties at discounted 
prices from work units (although only 13 per cent of the households in our sample did so), 
resulted in wealth redistribution through which these households might derive higher 
subjective wellbeing from (potential) capital gain from housing assets.  
To address these potential wealth effects, in Column (4) we control for the distance from 
one’s current residence to the nearest city/town centre as well as values of two non-
financial assets (houses and vehicles) and three financial assets (demand and term 
deposits and shares) to examine potential wealth effects on subjective wellbeing. Longer 
distance from one’s residence to the city centre has a negative impact on subjective 
wellbeing, consistent with recent findings that better commuting improves happiness (Wu, 
2014). None of the five asset types has a significant effect, while the coefficient on home 
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ownership types are similar to Column (5) in Table 4. In a further check (not reported 
here) we replaced the market value of housing assets with a potential capital gain variable 
indicating the difference between the purchase price and current market value of the 
housing asset. The potential capital gain variable is insignificant while the variables of 
homeownership types remain a significant predictor of subjective wellbeing. 
One might be concerned that minor ownership is usually in regions that used to be rural 
or suburban. Thus, it could be proxying missing variables, such as the population 
composition in the neighbourhood or poor local public services. As a robust check, we re-
estimate the main model excluding minor ownership. We do not report the results, but the 
main finding is that the results are almost identical to those reported in the final column 
of Table 3. Hence, the results hold, irrespective if minor ownership is dropped. 
Another potential concern might be whether the increase in home owners’ subjective 
wellbeing reflects not only home ownership per se, but also rising housing prices in urban 
China. To address this, we conducted two robust checks involving interaction effects 
between number of properties owned and appreciation of property value. The results 
suggested that this is not a major concern. The first check suggests that each additional 
property one owns increases life satisfaction by 0.18 points and that if one thinks that 
one’s property has appreciated in value, one’s life satisfaction is 0.12 points higher; 
however, number of properties interacted with thinking one’s properties have appreciated 
in value is insignificant. The second check distinguishes between whether one owns one 
property or more than one property interacted with thinking that one’s property/properties 
have appreciated in value. The findings confirm that owning one property and owning 
more than one property are positively related to life satisfaction. Owning more than one 
property increases life satisfaction by approximately double (0.36 points) the amount that 
owning one property does (0.19 points). However, when both variables are interacted 
with property value appreciation, the coefficients are insignificant. 
The last concern is that, besides individual fixed effects, subjective wellbeing may also 
be correlated with provincial random effects that are associated with, inter alia, 
differential housing policies, which could exert an independent impact on subjective 
wellbeing. To address this, we re-examine all columns in Table 3 using a two-level mixed 
effects model with individual fixed effects and provincial fixed effects with clustered 
standard errors. The results, which are not reported here, show that there is no substantial 
change to the individual parameters and that the variation of provincial parameter is 
mildly significant but small (0.009). The interclass correlation between individual and 
provincial levels is only 1 per cent; thus provincial effects are not a major concern.  
The results to this point treat subjective wellbeing as cardinal. The final two columns of 
Table 4 treat subjective wellbeing as ordinal. The ordered logit results in Table 4 do not 
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instrument for income so they are the ordinal equivalent of Column (5) in Table 3. The 
sign and significance of the variables in the ordered logit are almost the same as the OLS 
results in Column (5) of Table 3. The exception, again, is that income is insignificant.  
The final column of Table 4 presents the ordered logit results in which we instrument for 
income using consumption.  These results are the ordinal equivalent of the two-stage least 
squares results presented in the first column of Table 4. There are more significant 
variables than in the two-stage least squares regression and the sign and significance for 
the housing variables are similar to the full specification in Table 3. To be specific, full 
and partial ownership is positively related to life satisfaction, while minor ownership is 
negatively related to life satisfaction. Duration of residence and property size are 
significant, but the coefficients are very small. Number of full and minor home 
ownership properties is positively correlated with life satisfaction. Home ownership 
acquired through inheritance and resettlement has a negative effect on life satisfaction, 
relative to purchasing in the market. Those with a home loan have lower life satisfaction. 
Of those with a home loan, those with a housing provident fund loan or commercial bank 
loan have higher life satisfaction than those with a portfolio loan. As with the two-stage 
least squares results, the coefficient on income is positive and significant.  
7. Conclusion 
There is now a large literature exploring the determinants of subjective wellbeing in 
China.  There are, however, only a few studies that have focused on the relationship 
between home ownership and subjective wellbeing in China. This study has contributed 
to further understanding the relationship between home ownership and subjective 
wellbeing in China by presenting a theoretical model linking housing property rights to 
subjective wellbeing in China and empirically testing the theoretical predictions. We use 
a more recent dataset than previous studies, allow for a greater range of ownership forms, 
consider the source through which ownership was acquired and not only consider 
whether homeowners have a home loan, but also consider the source of the loan. 
The main finding is that home ownership is positively correlated with life satisfaction.  
Breaking this down further, full ownership and partial ownership is positively related 
with life satisfaction, while minor ownership has a negative effect on life satisfaction. 
This finding is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model if there is 
significant risk of adverse future events. Similarly consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical model, having a home loan has a negative effect on life satisfaction, while for 
those with a home loan, having a housing provident fund loan or commercial bank loan 
results in higher life satisfaction than having a portfolio loan. The source of home 
ownership also matters. Relative to those who purchased their homes, those who 
inherited their homes, built their homes or received them as part of a resettlement 
compensation package generally have lower life satisfaction. The coefficients on length 
of residence and property size were mostly very small in magnitude or insignificant.  
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The results have important public policy implications. At a base level, the results suggest 
that subjective wellbeing can be increased by promoting home ownership. However, this 
only tells part of the story. At a deeper level, the results suggest that not all home 
ownership forms are alike. Policies to promote full and partial ownership should be 
favoured over promoting minor ownership. The results for the source of ownership also 
speak to this point. Compared with purchasing in the market, acquiring property through 
resettlement schemes lower subjective wellbeing. The problem is that such schemes 
typically only provide very limited property rights in relatively poor quality housing, 
usually far removed from the city and with limited public amenities. The public policy 
implications is that the government can improve subjective wellbeing by laying the 
ground rules for stronger property rights in housing developments for resettlements and 
encouraging construction in locales closer to the city centre and in areas equipped with 
better infrastructure. The results also reveal that full and minor ownership properties are 
popular in the (informal) housing market, making multi-property owners of these two 
types happier. In fact, it has been a dilemma for the authorities to deal with the increasing 
volume of minor ownership properties which are essentially illegal but provide affordable 
housing for lower socio-economic status groups such as migrants (Song et al., 2008). Our 
results support the suggestion to level up minor ownership with partial ownership by 
granting the former legal status. Nonetheless, this relates to the land use policy in China, 
and, thus, needs to be addressed in a broader legal and institutional framework. 
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Table 1: Life Satisfaction by Homeownership  
 
 Mean  
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Very 
dissatisfied 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
Neutral (%) Satisfied (%) Very satisfied 
(%) 
Homeownership (N=4558) 3.75  0.80 0.72 4.21 30.08 49.06 15.93 
No homeownership (N=640) 3.50  0.89 2.34 8.44 38.13 39.06 12.03 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean or proportion 
Life satisfaction level (very unsatisfied=1, unsatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5) 3.72 
Male (%) 49.18 
Age (years) 48.15 
Schooling (years) 10.34 
Married (%) 84.93 
Household size 3.23 
Rural hukou (%) 29.96 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member (%) 19.04 
Number of social insurance schemes participated 1.61 
Monthly income (RMB/month in 2011) 1358.67 
Monthly consumption (RMB/monthly in 2010) 606.49 
Homeownership (%) 87.74 
Distance from nearest city/town centre by individual means of transportation (minutes) 39.26 
Market value of housing assets (million RMB) 1.13 
Market value of vehicles (million RMB) 0.05 
Demand deposit (million RMB) 0.02 
Term deposit (million RMB)  0.03 
Market value of shares (million RMB) 0.02 
Own one property (%) 71.57 
Own more than one property (%) 16.17 
Own full homeownership property (%) 70.44 
Own partial homeownership property (%) 15.37 
Own minor homeownership property (%) 7.21 
Number of properties owned 1.07 
Number of full homeownership properties 0.85 
Number of partial homeownership properties 0.11 
Number of minor homeownership properties 0.08 
Source of homeownership (%)  
  Purchased 52.71 
  Inherited/transferred 4.54 
  Self-built 33.73 
  Resettled/compensated due to redevelopment/demolition 6.30 
  Others 2.73 
Property tenure (years) 11.80 
Property size (m2) 99.59 
Property value appreciated (%) 85.35 
Has home loan (%) 10.08 
Type of home loan (%)  
  Housing provident fund loan  1.87 
  Commercial bank loan 92.67 
  Portfolio loan (combination of housing provident fund and commercial bank loans) 5.46 
Local public safety1 (very poor=1, very good=5) 3.44 
Risk aversion2 (highest=1, lowest=5) 2.24 
Economy expectation3 (very poor=1, very good=5) 3.78 
Property price expectation4 (decreases a lot=1, increases a lot=5) 3.79 
Commodity price expectation5 (decreases a lot=1, increases a lot=5) 4.14 
Interest rate expectation6 (decreases a lot=1, increases a lot=5) 3.75 
Region  
  West  13.50 
  Central 39.24 
  East 47.26 
Notes:  
1. What is your perception of public safety in the locality?  
2. Risk aversion: Which type of project would you invest in if you have the money? (1=unwilling to take any 
risk; 2=below-average risk and below-average return; 3= average risk and average return; 4= above-average 
risk and above-average return; 5=high risk and high return) 
3. What is your expectation of China’s economic prospects in the next three to five years? 
4. What is your expectation of property prices in the coming year?  
5. What is your expectation of commodity prices in the coming year?  
6. What is your expectation of interest rates in the coming year? 
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Table 3: Determinants of Life Satisfaction (OLS Results) 
 1  2  3  4  5  
Male (ref: female) -0.0877*** (-3.34) -0.0866*** (-3.29) -0.0820*** (-3.11) -0.0931*** (-3.18) -0.0965*** (-3.41) 
Age -0.0535*** (-10.41) -0.0529*** (-10.30) -0.0518*** (-10.08) -0.0545*** (-9.40) -0.0478*** (-8.52) 
Age2 0.000563*** (11.40) 0.000560*** (11.31) 0.000548*** (11.07) 0.000562*** (10.19) 0.000498*** (9.35) 
Schooling 0.0108** (2.46) 0.0109** (2.47) 0.00995** (2.24) 0.00768 (1.54) 0.0112** (2.32) 
Married (ref: no) 0.320*** (8.59) 0.317*** (8.50) 0.325*** (8.71) 0.282*** (6.59) 0.254*** (6.16) 
Household size -0.00485 (-0.47) -0.00340 (-0.33) -0.000207 (-0.97) -0.0186 (-1.56) -0.0118 (-1.03) 
Rural hukou (ref: urban) 0.0246 (0.71) 0.0309 (0.88) 0.0337 (0.97) 0.0292 (0.71) 0.0365 (0.92) 
CCP member (ref: no) 0.0935*** (2.76) 0.0928*** (2.74) 0.0943*** (2.78) 0.0932** (2.51) 0.0687* (1.92) 
No. of social insurance 0.0408*** (3.10) 0.0399*** (3.03) 0.0439*** (3.32) 0.0481*** (3.27) 0.0587*** (4.15) 
LnIncome -0.00266 (-0.53) -0.00254 (-0.50) -0.00287 (-0.57) -0.00476 (-0.83) -0.00942* (-1.72) 
Homeownership (ref: no) 0.214*** (5.70)         
Own partial homeownership property (ref: no)  0.260*** (4.72) 0.247*** (4.36) 0.389*** (3.61) 0.376*** (3.63) 
Own full homeownership property (ref: no)  0.188*** (5.28) 0.200*** (5.50) 0.235*** (2.65) 0.248*** (2.90) 
Own minor homeownership property (ref: no)  -0.130* (-1.85) -0.116* (-1.86) -0.160** (-2.08) -0.149** (-2.02) 
Home loan (ref: no)     -0.176* (1.66) -0.491*** (-3.24) -0.489*** (-3.37) 
Own full homeownership property × Home loan    -0.214* (-1.64)     
Property tenure       -0.00320* (-1.73) -0.00408** (-2.29) 
Property size       0.000885*** (3.38) 0.000784*** (3.12) 
No. of partial homeownership properties      0.0535 (1.19) 0.0569 (1.32) 
No. of full homeownership properties      0.108*** (3.19) 0.0939*** (2.90) 
No. of minor homeownership properties      0.266*** (2.83) 0.274*** (3.05) 
Source of homeownership (ref: purchased)          
  Inherited/transferred       -0.189*** (-2.60) -0.172** (-2.46) 
  Self-built       -0.0695* (-1.70) -0.0448 (-1.14) 
  Resettled/compensated       -0.139** (-2.52) -0.106** (-1.99) 
  Others       -0.0226 (-0.27) 0.00427 (0.05) 
Type of home loan (ref: portfolio loan)          
  Housing provident fund loan       0.548*** (3.14) 0.546*** (3.26) 
  Commercial bank loan       0.495*** (3.08) 0.521*** (3.38) 
Perceive better local public safety         0.155*** (10.14) 
Express lower risk aversion         0.0145 (1.20) 
Expect better economy         0.183*** (11.26) 
Expect higher house price         -0.0235 (-1.47) 
Expect higher commodity price         0.00312 (0.17) 
Expect higher interest rate         0.0263 (1.30) 
Region Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Constant 4.264*** (28.63) 4.257*** (28.54) 4.267*** (28.59) 4.247*** (24.21) 2.765*** (12.70) 
N 4127  4128  4125                 3231              3231  
adj. R2 0.064  0.064  0.0679                0.072              0.146  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Robust Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TSLS regression 
with consumption as IV 
TSLS regression  
with (   ̅   ̂ as IV 
OLS regression 
without property tenure 
OLS regression with 
potential wealth effects 
Ordered logit regression 
 
Ordered logit regression 
with consumption as IV 
Male (ref: female) -0.753** (-2.19) -0.0778** (-2.30) -0.0965*** (-3.44) -0.0967*** (-3.40) -0.251*** (-3.44) -0.112*** (-2.94) 
Age -0.0771*** (-3.91) -0.0472*** (-8.40) -0.0481*** (-8.69) -0.0475*** (-8.44) -0.129*** (-8.62) -0.0656*** (-8.23) 
Age2 0.00150*** (2.85) 0.000472*** (8.00) 0.000495*** (9.41) 0.000498*** (9.33) 0.00134*** (9.41) 0.000689*** (8.99) 
Schooling 0.0385** (2.12) 0.0104** (2.13) 0.0118** (2.47) 0.0117** (2.40) 0.0224* (1.78) 0.00729 (1.10) 
Married (ref: no) 0.344*** (3.29) 0.252*** (6.15) 0.263*** (6.45) 0.249*** (5.99) 0.626*** (5.80) 0.318*** (5.63) 
Household size 0.0327 (0.92) -0.0132 (-1.15) -0.0121 (-1.07) -0.0106 (-0.92) -0.0349 (-1.19) -0.00461 (-0.30) 
Rural hukou (ref: urban) -0.824* (-1.83) 0.0612 (1.31) 0.0343 (0.87) 0.0395 (0.99) 0.0664 (0.65) 0.0470 (0.89) 
Party member (ref: no) 0.0489 (0.59) 0.0690* (1.94) 0.0709** (2.01) 0.0677* (1.89) 0.175* (1.92) 0.0784 (1.63) 
Social insurance -0.962* (-1.83) 0.0877*** (2.73) 0.0567*** (4.04) 0.0578*** (4.06) 0.143*** (3.89) 0.0691*** (3.59) 
LnIncome 0.639* (1.91) -0.0281 (-1.45) -0.00875 (-1.61) -0.00879 (-1.60) -0.0225 (-1.59) 0.103*** (5.21) 
Own partial homeownership property (ref: no) 0.605** (2.25) 0.368*** (3.55) 0.328*** (3.24) 0.244*** (2.86) 0.995*** (3.54) 0.473*** (3.41) 
Own full homeownership property (ref: no) 0.573** (2.22) 0.236*** (2.76) 0.198** (2.40) 0.373*** (3.60) 0.630*** (2.83) 0.314*** (2.76) 
Own minor homeownership property (ref: no) -0.163 (-0.95) -0.149** (-2.02) -0.146** (-2.00) -0.134* (-1.81) -0.366* (-1.90) -0.204** (-2.07) 
Property tenure 0.00313 (0.58) -0.00422** (-2.37)   -0.00423** (-2.37) -0.00902** (-1.96) -0.00525** (-2.19) 
Property size -0.000332 (-0.41) 0.000819*** (3.24) 0.000914*** (3.72) 0.000827*** (3.26) 0.00220*** (3.32) 0.000915*** (2.70) 
No. of partial homeownership properties 0.0254 (0.25) 0.0577 (1.35) 0.0566 (1.32) 0.0507 (1.18) 0.147 (1.13) 0.00677 (1.20) 
No. of full homeownership properties -0.0607 (-0.56) 0.0985*** (3.02) 0.0953*** (2.97) 0.0933*** (2.86) 0.267*** (3.13) 0.105** (2.38) 
No. of minor homeownership properties 0.293 (1.40) 0.272*** (3.03) 0.242*** (2.73) 0.266*** (2.95) 0.732*** (3.02) 0.334*** (2.79) 
Source of homeownership (ref: purchased)            
  Inherited/transferred -0.357* (-1.83) -0.166** (-2.38) -0.190*** (-2.79) -0.173** (-2.48) -0.394** (-2.15) -0.170* (-1.81) 
  Self-built -0.149 (-1.41) -0.0419 (-1.07) -0.0767** (-2.06) -0.0472 (-1.20) -0.125 (-1.24) -0.0471 (-0.90) 
  Resettled/compensated 0.175 (0.90) -0.114** (-2.12) -0.101* (-1.92) -0.109** (-2.05) -0.259* (-1.88) -0.143** (2.79) 
  Others 0.182 (0.88) -0.000766 (-0.01) -0.00499 (-0.06) 0.00272 (0.03) 0.0551 (0.27) -0.000877 (-0.01) 
Home loan (ref: no) -0.160 (-0.43) -0.498*** (-3.43) -0.469*** (-3.25) -0.487*** (-3.35) -1.145*** (-2.93) -0.606*** (-3.14) 
Type of home loan (ref: portfolio loan)             
  Housing provident fund loan 0.121 (0.27) 0.558*** (3.33) 0.537*** (3.23) 0.548*** (3.27) 1.304*** (2.94) 0.701*** (3.14) 
  Commercial bank loan -0.0269 (-0.06) 0.537*** (3.47) 0.515*** (3.36) 0.513*** (3.32) 1.238*** (3.00) 0.657*** (3.21) 
Perceive better local public safety 0.0550 (0.91) 0.158*** (10.20) 0.153*** (10.09) 0.156*** (10.22) 0.424*** (10.46) 0.202*** (9.17) 
Express lower risk aversion -0.00178 (-0.06) 0.0150 (1.25) 0.0143 (1.20) 0.0138 (1.15) 0.0382 (1.24) 0.0108 (0.67) 
Expect better economy 0.143*** (3.44) 0.183*** (11.34) 0.181*** (11.28) 0.180*** (11.01) 0.490*** (11.28) 0.246*** (10.59) 
Expect higher house price -0.0750* (-1.68) -0.0223 (-1.39) -0.0234 (-1.48) -0.0270* (-1.67) -0.0676 (-1.62) -0.0299 (-1.39) 
Expect higher commodity price -0.00665 (-0.16) 0.00345 (0.19) 0.000338 (0.02) 0.00581 (0.32) 0.00951 (0.21) -0.00148 (-0.06) 
Expect higher interest rate 0.0377 (0.80) 0.0260 (1.29) 0.0241 (1.21) 0.0221 (1.09) 0.0727 (1.36) 0.0260 (0.97) 
Distance from nearest city/town centre       -0.000796* (-1.85)     
Market value of housing assets       -0.0000349 (-0.00)     
Market value of vehicles       -0.0998 (-1.62)     
Demand deposit       -0.000224 (-0.00)     
Term deposit       -0.0583 (-0.45)     
Market value of shares       -0.0637 (-0.78)     
 Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Constant 1.548* (1.85) 2.807*** (12.70) 2.800*** (13.00) 2.800*** (12.73)     
Constant-cut1         -2.608*** (-4.39) -0.913*** (-2.97) 
Constant-cut2         -0.737 (-1.29) -0.147 (-0.49) 
Constant-cut3         1.790*** (3.15) 1.116*** (3.82) 
Constant-cut4         4.329*** (7.55) 2.480*** (8.40) 
N 3186  3231  3214  3217  3231  4147  
IV relevance and validity tests             
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Endogeneity test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
F test (p-value) 
0.00001            
Underidentification test: Anderson 
canon. corr. LM statistic (p-value) 
0.0316  0.0000          
 
Weak identification test: Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic (10% critical value) 
4.578  (16.38) 8.621 (11.29)         
t statistics in parentheses for OLS and TSLS regressions; z statistics in parentheses for logit regressions 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
